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A CLARIFICATION OF THE
MAXIMUM OCCUPANCY RESTRICTION OF THE FHA
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.
115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995)
Clover S. Pitts
"damnant quod non intelligunt1
I. INTRODUCTION
In handing down City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. on May 15, 1995, the
United States Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the Eleventh and Ninth
Circuits concerning discrimination in zoning laws which limits the ability of
handicapped individuals to live in a residence of their choice. The majority opin-
ion decided that the traditional zoning definition of single family did not consti-
tute a reasonable occupancy limitation pursuant to the exemption created by the
Fair Housing Amendments Act.2 The majority made clear that under the Fair
Housing Act, a city may not use its zoning ordinances to prohibit establishment
of group drug and alcohol recovery homes.
This Note will discuss the concerns of group homes and the neighborhoods
and cities which are affected as well as the provisions of the Fair Housing Act
[hereinafter "the FHA"], the Fair Housing Amendments Act [hereinafter "the
FHAA"], and the exemptions to the Acts which apply to Edmonds. In addition,
this Note will examine the history of the law regarding exclusionary zoning,
treatment of the handicapped, and cases involving Oxford Houses. Finally, this
Note will analyze the Supreme Court's interpretation of the occupancy limitation
in Edmonds and discuss its implications.
II. GROUP HOMES FOR THE HANDICAPPED
Oxford Houses are drug recovery homes where recovering addicts and alco-
holics live, share expenses and household work, and make decisions like a fami-
ly.' Certain standards govern Oxford Houses: democratic administration, finan-
cial independence, strict drug prohibition, and peer assistance.4
Drug and alcohol recovery and rehabilitation depends to a great extent on the
environment in which it occurs.' The houses seek to provide an atmosphere con-
ducive to recovery - a stable, supportive, and drug- and alcohol-free environ-
ment.' The success of the program is directly related to the ability of the homes
1. They condemn what they do not understand.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (1988).
3. Peter Carlson, The Oxford House Experiment, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1989, atWl5.
4. Id.
5. Margaret Allison & Robert L. Hubbard, Drug Abuse Treatment Process: A Review of the Literature, 20
INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 1321, 1325-26 (1985).
6. G. ALAN MARLAT-r & JUDITH GORDON, RELAPSE PREVENTION 402 (1985).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
to help the addict become a responsible member of a family and of society.7
Studies have shown that a recovering addict in a group home was more likely to
remain sober, gainfully employed, and involved in "socially acceptable" activi-
ties.' As a result, group homes such as Oxford Houses in single-family residen-
tial neighborhoods are effective.' By contrast, a return to a neighborhood like
the one the addict came from can lead to renewed addiction.1"
However, the establishment of an Oxford House or other group home in a
neighborhood often causes conflict between the needs of the group homes and
the concerns of the city and its single-family neighborhood residents. Typically,
the city and its residents are concerned with preserving the integrity of their
neighborhoods in single-family residential zones.11 Neighbors fear that the pres-
ence of addicts in their neighborhoods will affect adversely the frequency of
property resale, the value of their houses, and the safety of their families.12 They
also worry that the group home's more intense use, including additional traffic
and noise, will bother surrounding residents.
13
Although the residents have legitimate concerns, unfortunately, many of the
objections are unfounded. Misconceptions about the group home's impact on the
neighborhood most often are responsible for this misapprehension. In fact, the
establishment of a group home has been demonstrated not to cause an effect on
property value, frequency of resale, or neighborhood crime incidence. 4
By attempting to preserve residential character of single-family residential
neighborhoods, this type of zoning effectively excludes group homes. When a
group home is established in a single-family residential zone, neighbors typically
complain to their local city council and mayor. The residents ask their municipal
governments to close group homes and sanction them for zoning ordinance vio-
lations.1 Residents most often rely on maximum occupancy restrictions which
generally allow a specific number of unrelated persons to occupy single-family
residences.1" To justify exclusion from single-family residential neighborhoods,
cities attempt to provide an area for them in multi-family or commercial areas.1
7
While this solution quiets complaints, it frustrates the group home resident's
recovery and limits success of the group home since the proper environment is
crucial.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 404, 456.
9. Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 E Supp. 1556, 1578 (E.D. Mo. 1994), revd, 77 E3d 249 (8th
Cir. 1996).
10. Carlson, supra note 3, at W15. See also OxfordHouse-C, 843 E Supp. at 1578 ("Plaintiffs showed that
they face a substantial risk of relapse from the isolation of living alone, the stress of living with enabling or
using family members, and the peer pressure inherent in returning to their old neighborhoods.")
11. Peter W Salsich, Jr., Group Homes, Shelters, and Congregate Housing: Deinstitutionalizing Policies and
the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413 (1986).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Patricia Pollak, Zoning Matters in a Kinder, Gentler Nation: Balancing Needs, Rights and Political
Realities for Shared Residences for the Elderly, 10 ST. LoUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 501 (1991).
15. Salsich, supra note 11, at 413.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (1988).
17. Salsich, supra note 11, at 413.
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111. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT
A thorough understanding of the Court's holding in Edmonds requires a basic
introduction to the FHA and the FHAA as well as the exemptions that apply to
the situation in Edmonds. Although courts have differed in their interpretation of
the Act and its Amendments and exemptions, the following description provides
an introduction to the provisions.
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act, prohibits dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.18
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
which extended the same protection to the handicapped.19
The FHAA makes it unlawful "to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to other-
wise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a
handicap."20 Discrimination includes a "refusal to make reasonable accommoda-
tions in rules, policies, practices, or services" necessary to afford disabled indi-
viduals "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."21
Congress relied primarily on the Rehabilitation Act of 197322 and intended for
the laws to operate consistently.23 The courts extended FHA protection to recov-
ering drug addicts and alcoholics.24 The legislative history also favors this appli-
cation of the FHA.28
Even though the FHAA has protected housing for the handicapped, zoning reg-
ulation regarding the handicapped is not well defined.28 The FHAA does not
explicitly refer to zoning laws. However, the wording of the prohibition and the
definition of discrimination indicate that the law was intended to apply to local
zoning."7 The House Committee Report suggests that the FHAA applies to zon-
ing laws.28 Nevertheless, local zoning laws often have deprived handicapped
group home residents of potential housing available to those who are not handi-
capped.29
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Gender was added as a protected class by the 1974
Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b)(i)-(3), 88 Stat. 729 (1974) (amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1988)).
19. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, Stat. 1619 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2) (1988).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1988).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
23. H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183 ("The
Committee intends that the definition be interpreted consistent with regulations clarifying the meaning of the
similar provision found in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.").
24. United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 E2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992); Oxford House-Evergreen v.
City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1342 (D.N.J. 1991).
25. The House Report explained that the definition of handicap includes "individuals who have recovered
from an addition [sic] or are participating in a treatment program or a self-help group such as Narcotics
Anonymous .... Depriving such individuals of housing, or evicting them, would constitute irrational discrimi-
nation that may seriously jeopardize their continued recovery." H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 23, at 22.
26. See William D. McElyea, The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988: Potential Impact on Zoning
Practices Regarding Group Homes for the Handicapped, 12 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 145 (1989).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), (f)(3)(B) (1988).
28. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 23, at 22.
29. McElyea, supra note 26, at 147.
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To avoid interfering with local, state, and federal restrictions conceived to
secure the safe occupancy of housing, the FHA permits governmental entities to
adopt restrictions concerning the maximum number of residents allowed to occu-
py a residence." The Act exempts "any reasonable local, State or Federal restric-
tions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a
dwelling."31 Congress created the exemption to appease the concern that forbid-
ding discrimination based on familial status would require landlords to rent small
housing units to large families. 2
The FHA attempts to provide handicapped persons with opportunities to live in
desirable and beneficial residential surroundings. As such, the Act protects
handicapped people, including recovering alcoholics and substance abusers, from
discrimination and requires landlords and government entities to offer reasonable
accommodations for achieving equal housing opportunities.
IV FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE INSTANT CASE
When the dispute arose, the City of Edmonds, Washington, a suburb of Seattle,
operated under a Community Development Code that set aside part of the city
for single-family use only, and provided other districts for multiple family resi-
dences, commercial, light industrial, and other uses. 33 In the summer of 1990,
Oxford House, Inc. established a group home for ten to twelve adults recovering
from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single family
residences in Edmonds.34 Neighbors filed complaints with the city's zoning offi-
cials, protesting the group home proposal.3
The city of Edmonds subsequently cited the owner of Oxford House and its
representative. 36 The citations charged violations of Edmonds' zoning code
which allowed only members of a family or a group of five or fewer unrelated
people to occupy a single-family dwelling.3 7 For these purposes, the code
defined "family" as any number of people related by blood, adoption, or mar-
riage, or a group of five or fewer unrelated persons.38 Since more than five unre-
lated persons occupied the Oxford House, it violated the city code.
3 9
In response to the city's action, Oxford House sought relief based on the city's
failure to make reasonable accommodation as required under the FHAA.4° The
Department of Justice filed a separate action on the same grounds, and the cases
were consolidated.41 Subsequently, the city suspended its charges and took no
further action as to its initial claim.42 The city, however, concurrently sought a
30. 42. U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1988).
31. Id.
32. Respondent's Brief at 14, City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995) (No. 94-23).
33. EDMONDS COMMUNITY DEV. CODE § 21.30.010 (1991).




38. Id. See EDMONDS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CODE § 21.030.010 (1991).
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declaratory judgment in federal district court that its "family" provision was
exempt from the FHA.4"
A. United States District Court
The city sued Oxford House in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington." The city conceded for purposes of the litigation that
the recovering alcoholics and drug addicts who resided in Oxford House quali-
fied as handicapped persons within the meaning of the FHA.4 ' However, it
argued that its single-family restriction qualified under the exemption as a rea-
sonable restriction regarding the number of occupants permitted to occupy a
dwelling. 6
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city.47 Relying on
a 1992 decision by a split Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel in Elliott v.
City of Athens,48 the district court held that the "family" provision of the city's
zoning code rule (ECDC Section 21.30.010) (the city's definition of single-fami-
ly zoning) was exempt from the FHA as a reasonable occupancy limit under 42
U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1). 9 In Elliott, a zoning ordinance similar to the one in
Edmonds was held to fall within the FHA exemption for reasonable maximum
occupancy restrictions, even though it may have had a disparate impact on handi-
capped occupants desiring to live in group homes.
50
B. Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals
Reversing, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the exemption inapplica-
ble because the numerical restriction, covering only unrelated people, was not
uniformly applied to "all occupants.""
The court found the exemption ambiguous as applied to the Edmonds ordi-
nances and based its decision primarily on the legislative record before
Congress.5 2 The court ruled that, despite the statute's language, it was not clear
that Congress intended the FHA to exempt Edmonds' zoning ordinance."3
Instead, the FHAA's legislative history indicated that laws limiting occupancy
were acceptable if they applied to all residents.54 The Ninth Circuit found that
the Edmonds ordinance did not restrict the size of all single-family homes, since
43. Id. The city enacted a regulation allowing group homes as permitted uses in multi-family and commer-
cial zones. Id. The city repealed portions of the Community Development Code which mandated a special use
permit for group homes for the disabled in multi-family zones because of the possibility that such a permit
went against the holding of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). Id.




48. City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 E3d 802, 803 (9th Cir. 1994) (referring to
Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 E2d 975, 979-81 (11 th Cir. 1992).
49. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1779 (1995).
50. Elliot, 960 E2d at 979-81.
51. Edmonds, 18 E3d at 807.
52. Id. at 804-805.
53. Id. at 804.
54. Id. at 805 (citing H.R. RE. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988)).
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traditional families could include an unlimited number of people."5 In so hold-
ing, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the district court's application of the
Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Elliott. 6
The court found that federal housing discrimination laws prohibited cities from
using local zoning ordinances to exclude alcohol and drug rehabilitation homes
from single-family residential neighborhoods.5 7 Thus, the court concluded that
the city's ordinance was not exempt from the FHAA because it did not apply to
all occupants.'6
V HISTORY OF EXCLUSIONARY ZONING AND GROUP HOMES
A. FHAA ' Exemption of Maximum Occupancy Regulations
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the United States Supreme Court
held that zoning measures were valid unless "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare."5 9 The Court sustained under the police power of the state a zoning ordi-
nance which limited, with some exceptions, the occupancy of single-family
dwellings to traditional families or groups of not more than two unrelated per-
sons.6" The Court explained that "[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing in the
wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control."61 The Court focused on the exclusion of
industries and apartments from single-family areas in order to keep residential
areas free from "disturbing noises," "increased traffic," and the hazard of "mov-
ing and parked automobiles" and to prevent "depriving children of the privilege
of quiet and open spaces for play."62 In doing so, the Court found legitimate a
land-use project which preserved the family's need for "[a] quiet place where
yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted."63
Since Euclid in 1926, the Court has been greatly deferential to the states in the
area of zoning.64 Many cases have respected local zoning ordinances designed to
preserve the single-family residential neighborhood.65 For example, in 1974, the
Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas upheld a local zoning ordi-
nance definition of "family" as persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption,
or no more than two unrelated persons living together.66 Six college students
55. Edmonds, 18 F.3d at 805.
56. Id. at 806.
57. Id. at 807.
58. Id. at 806-07.
59. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
60. Id. at 397.
61. Id. at 388.
62. Id. at 394.
63. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
64. See Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that "[i]t has long been clear that
zoning legislation is entitled to deference and respect.").
65. Id. See also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974).
66. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 2.
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who were cited for violating the ordinance brought suit to have the ordinance
declared unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 7 The students had
rented a house in a single-family neighborhood. 8 The Court found the distinc-
tion between related and unrelated people rationally related to a legitimate inter-
est in maintaining the single-family character of a neighborhood.69
Yet, the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that defined "family" as only mem-
bers of the nuclear family in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.7" Unlike the ordi-
nance in Moore, the zoning regulation in Belle Terre governed unrelated persons.71
In Moore, Inez Moore was convicted of violating a zoning ordinance by allowing
her son and grandsons to live with her.72 The Court held that the "freedom of per-
sonal choice in matters of marriage and family life" was a fundamental right pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 Since a funda-
mental right was at issue, the Court's usual deference to zoning laws was absent.74
Instead, the Court scrutinized the "importance of the governmental interests and
the extent to which they [were] served by the challenged regulation.""
Moore and Belle Terre indicate that placing occupancy limitations on unrelated
but not on related persons is a valid method of controlling density.76 While the
restriction of family relationships violated constitutional rights, the exclusion of
group homes thought to threaten single-family neighborhoods was upheld. The
Courts of Appeal for the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have followed this
reasoning, to some extent.77
In Doe v. City of Butler, the Third Circuit concluded that a zoning regulation
was rationally related to a legitimate state interest in controlling density and
upheld the regulation even though it limited to six the number of unrelated per-
sons in a residence while failing to limit the number of related persons. 78 The
court rejected the argument that the zoning restriction was not related to density
control because there were no limits placed on the occupancy of related per-
sons.79 The court maintained that "[i]f the absence of an occupancy limitation on
the members of a family who can live together is bootstrapped into the argument
that therefore there can be no occupancy limitation for unrelated persons living
together, there could never be such an occupancy limitation and Belle Terre
would be meaningless."8
67. Id. at 2-3.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
71. Id. at 498.
72. Id. at 496-97.
73. Id. at 499. The appellant further alleged that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause; howev-
er, the court did not address that argument. Id. at 496 n.3.
74. Id. at 499.
75. Id.
76. Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F2d 975, 980 (11 th Cir. 1992).
77. See Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F2d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 1989); Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St.
Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991); Elliott, 960 F2d at 979.
78. Doe, 892 E2d at 320.
79. Id. at 321.
80. Id.
1997]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Likewise, in Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, the Eighth Circuit
upheld an ordinance regulating group homes.81 The City of St. Paul denied
Familystyle special use permits to add three group homes for mentally ill patients
under the existing state and local requirements.82 Familystyle challenged the city
and state provisions.83 In rendering its decision, the court applied the rational
basis standard,84 relying on City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.85 for
the proposition that handicapped persons did not constitute a suspect class and
therefore did not require the same degree of scrutiny.88 The court upheld the
ordinance, concluding that the government's interest in deinstitutionalization
rebutted any discrimination caused by the housing requirement.8
A more recent decision in this line of cases is the significant ruling by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Elliott v. City of Athens.88 In Elliott, the
City of Athens, relying on a local ordinance which allowed no more than four
unrelated individuals in a residence, refused to allow a group home for twelve
recovering alcoholics to live in two separate houses.89 For the house to function
economically, more than eleven residents were necessary.9"
The Eleventh Circuit found the ordinance "reasonable" under the FHAA
exemption for "maximum number of occupants." 91 According to the court, the
city had a legitimate interest in controlling density, traffic, and noise.92
Previously, however, the planning department had determined that the group
home would not burden municipal services such as transportation, water, and
waste disposal.93 Yet this department recommended denial of the permit because
allowing the group home to operate would establish a "negative precedent" and
would "constitute spot zoning.' '94
The dissent in Elliott disagreed with the majority's finding of reasonableness
and equal application to all persons as required by statute.9" Responding to the
majority's assertion that Congress was merely citing instances of reasonable
occupancy restriction,98 the dissent argued that the exemptions in the ordinance
81. Familystyle of St. Paul, 923 F.2d at 95.
82. Id. at 92.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
86. Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1991).
87. Id.
88. 960 F.2d 975 (11 th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 976.
90. Id. at 981.
91. Id. at 980. See also 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1988) (providing that "[n]othing in this subchapter limits the
applicability of any reasonable local, State, or Federal restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants
permitted to occupy a dwelling.").
92. Elliot, 960 F.2d at 983.
93. Id. at 977. The alleged purpose of the ordinance was the prevention of overcrowded neighborhoods near
the university without unduly limiting families. Id. at 976-77. The city claimed that the restriction on unrelated
people most effectively maintained the residential atmosphere of the neighborhood. Id.
94. Id. at 977. Instead of being based on legitimate local interests, the restriction on occupancy was ground-
ed in the refusal to create a special exception and reasonably accommodate the handicapped. Id. This basis for
refusal violates the FHAA.
95. Id. at 985 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 980 (citing H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988)).
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concerned family status and would be upheld if applied to all occupants.97 The
Athens ordinance applied only to unrelated occupants.98
Even though the availability of other zones was not a permissible basis for
exclusion,99 the majority based its decision in part on the availability of other
zones in Athens for group homes.100 According to the court, the FHAA does not
mandate providing housing "wherever they desire."10 1
The dissent pointed out that under the FHA, a failure to make reasonable
accommodations constitutes discrimination and a disparate impact analysis may
not be appropriate. 2 According to the dissent, preferential treatment is required
for handicapped persons. 0 3 Handicapped persons must show discrimination, or
the failure to make reasonable accommodation to provide them equal access to
housing.'14
Following Elliott, courts generally either have followed the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation of the exemption or have shown similar deference to local regula-
tion. However, these decisions have differed in their beliefs for a group home's
need to maintain a minimum number of residents. This conflict reflected the
lack of and need for a uniform approach to the issue.
B. Handicapped Status Under the FHA
The United States Supreme Court afforded greater protection for handicapped
persons under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in Alexander v. Choate.10 5 In
Alexander, the Court held that Tennessee's decrease in the number of inpatient
hospital days qualifying for Medicaid payment did not violate § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 even though it had a substantial effect on the handi-
capped.'0 6 The Court rejected the state's argument that § 504 only applies to
intentional discrimination against handicapped persons.0 7 Instead, the Court
said that "discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of apa-
thetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus. '  The Court found that the
Rehabilitation Act did not prohibit only actions with discriminatory intent.0 9
97. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 31 (1988)). The House Report states that
"Section 6(d) amends Section 807 to make additional exemptions relating to the familial status provisions....
A number ofjurisdictions limit the number of occupants per unit based on a minimum number of square feet in
the unit or the sleeping areas of the unit. Reasonable limitations by governments would be allowed to continue,
as long as they were applied to all occupants, and did not operate to discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, handicap or familial status." H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 31
(1988).
98. Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 986 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
99. Id. at 982.
100. Id. at 983.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 987.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
106. Id. at 306.
107. Id. at 294.
108. Id. at 296.
109. Id. at 296-97.
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The Fourth Circuit concluded that rehabilitated addicts should be included in
the handicap definition under the FHAA in United States v. Southern
Management Corp."' In Southern Management, "' the United States sued SMC
under the FHAA for refusing to rent to a drug rehabilitation service provider,
arguing that the refusal to rent to the provider illegally discriminated against the
handicapped." 2 SMC claimed that the FHAA did not apply to the provider's
clients, "recovering addicts," since they were not handicapped within the mean-
ing of the FHAA and were specifically excepted from the statute.'" 3 The statute
specifically excluded "current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled sub-
stance" from the definition of handicap." 4 Based on its interpretation of the leg-
islative history of the FHAA and the applicable portions of the Rehabilitation
Act, 1 the court decided that a "rehabilitated addict" came within the
legislation. 16 The court construed the FHAA consistently with the
Rehabilitation Act." 7 This construction meant that participation in a rehabilita-
tion program together with cessation of drug use brought an individual within the
handicap definition.1 ' The court held that the clients were handicapped and that
their access to housing was restricted by the refusal to rent to the provider. 9
In Cleburne, the Supreme Court refused to find the handicapped a suspect class
but upheld the invalidation of a use permit restriction for the operation of a group
home for the mentally retarded. 2 The Cleburne Living Center, a not-for-profit
Texas corporation, sought to lease a house in Cleburne for a group home for the
mentally retarded.121 The home at issue was located in an area zoned for apart-
ments where many multi-family uses were permitted, including hospitals, nursing
homes, and homes for convalescents or elderly other than the mentally impaired
or alcoholics or drug addicts.122 The city board classified the group home as a
hospital for the "feeble-minded" and required the Center to apply for a special-use
permit.123 When the Center's application was denied, the Center filed suit, alleg-
ing that the zoning ordinance discriminated against people with mental retarda-
tion.'24 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas upheld
the ordinance.'25 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the use
permit restriction, 26 reasoning that the mentally retarded constituted a quasi-
suspect class and therefore were entitled to a heightened level of scrutiny.'27
110. 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992).
111. Id. at 914-15.
112. Id. at 916.
113. Id. at 917.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(3) (1988).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(c) (1991).
116. United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 E2d 914, 922 (4th Cir. 1992).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 919.
120. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
121. Id. at 435.
122. Id. at436 n.3.
123. Id. at 436-37.
124. Id. at 437.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 437-38.
127. Id.
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The Supreme Court refused to apply a heightened level of scrutiny, 2 ' neverthe-
less, it struck down the ordinance under the rational basis test.129 The majority
found that "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which
[were] properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding [were] not permissible bases
for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses,
multiple dwellings, and the like."' 30
C. Oxford House Cases
A series of Oxford House cases have made clear that federal courts generally
find recovery home residents a protected class under the FHAA. For example,
Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, concerned a zoning dispute over a
maximum occupancy restriction based on a "functional definition of family."' 1
An Oxford House in the City of Plainfield allowed nine men rather than six, as
permitted by the zoning law, to reside in its home for recovering drug addicts and
alcoholics.'32 The city subsequently limited occupancy to six current residents
and banned any additional occupants.'33 The Plainfield Zoning Board decided
that the residents did not meet the "permanent" or "domestic" requirements of
the Plainfield Zoning Code necessary to qualify as a family."4
The residents then appealed the order based on their inability to sustain the
house economically with only six residents. 135 The court decided that the city's
actions discriminated against the plaintiffs by separating them from non-handi-
capped persons, thus showing discrimination in violation of the FHAA. 36 In
addition, the court found the family definition discriminatory because recovering
alcoholics and addicts might never be considered "stable" or "permanent" by
complaining neighbors and municipalities. 137 The court found that the irrepara-
ble injury of eviction would outweigh any harm to the defendants.' 38 In addition,
the public interest in recovery efforts supported this decision.
139
Similarly, in Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, a township's
refusal to issue a certificate of occupancy to an Oxford House based on the defi-
nition of family in the zoning ordinance was found to discriminate unfairly
against the residents of a group home. 40 In Cherry Hill, the court enjoined a
township from preventing the occupation of an Oxford House. 4'
The court held that the definition of "family" under the ordinance unfairly dis-
criminated against unrelated handicapped people occupying rental property
128. Id. at 442.
129. Id. at 450.
130. Id. at 448.
131. Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1332-33 (D.N.J. 1991).
132. Id. at 1334 n.3, 1334.
133. Id. at 1333.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1334.
136. Id. at 1344.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1345.
139. Id. at 1345-46.
140. Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 799 E Supp 450, 455, 461 (D.N.J. 1992).
141. Id. at 465.
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together by imposing stricter requirements on them than on related people. 142
According to the court, the residents of the Oxford House could suffer substan-
tial harm if they were not allowed to occupy the group home.'43
Numerical restrictions on occupancy have also been challenged as having a
disparate impact on handicapped residents. In Oxford House-C v. City of St.
Louis, an eight-resident limitation was held to be exclusionary since Oxford
Houses usually require more than eight residents to operate viably, both finan-
cially and therapeutically.'44 Although the city had a legitimate interest in pre-
serving the neighborhood's residential character, it gave no reasonable basis for
the restriction and stated no legitimate interest that supported allowing eight resi-
dents, but not more. 45 The court concluded that the ordinance was unnecessary
for the preservation of residential character. 4 6 Instead, the court found the
restriction to be artificial and the ordinance to be irrational.'47 Because the court
found that the group homes were denied permits out of community angst, 48 it
decided that the city's enforcement was discriminatory.'49
However, in Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, a city ordinance per-
mitting four or fewer unrelated residents in a dwelling and requiring a special-
use permit for a residence for recovering alcoholics and drug abusers was found
not to violate the FHAA.' While the court concluded that the FHAA protected
persons with handicaps from discrimination, it held that the FHAA did not pro-
hibit zoning officials from inquiring into housing for handicapped persons.' In
rejecting an argument based on Elliott, the court cited legislative history support-
ing the validity of the maximum occupancy limitation exemption only if applied
uniformly to all individuals, related and unrelated.5 2 Because the ordinance
applied only to unrelated persons, it was not exempt from the FHAA, according
to the court.'53
The Oxford House cases establish that arbitrary classification by municipali-
ties in group home cases will not be upheld. In the Oxford House cases, regula-
tions governing traditional group homes often are not supported by legitimate
government interests. While courts generally support government interests in
neighborhood character and protection, they look closely at the way these poli-
cies are implemented. Where a regulation is based on discriminatory or non-
legitimate motives, a court generally will invalidate it.
142. Id. at 461.
143. Id. at 463.
144. Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 E Supp. 1556, 1579 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
145. Id. at 1579-80.
146. Id. at 1580.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1576.
149. Id. at 1577.
150. Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 E Supp. 1251, 1254 (ED. Va. 1993).
151. Id. at 1264-65.
152. Id. at 1261.
153. Id. at 1254.
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VI. THE INSTANT CASE
The Supreme Court granted the City of Edmonds' petition for a writ of certio-
rari to resolve the conflict between the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits concerning
the scope of the exemption." 4
A. Oxford House and the Department of Justice Argument
Oxford House and the Department of Justice argued that the city's zoning plan
violated the FHAA because the group home of ten to twelve recovering drug
addicts and alcoholics was excluded from the single-family zone."' The zoning
system was allegedly discriminatory because single-family residences were lim-
ited to five unrelated adult disabled persons while an unlimited number of related
family members could reside together as long as the residence met Uniform
Housing Code square footage standards.' Thus, reading the FHA as exempting
single-family zoning would have undermined the FHA's goal of providing fair
housing for handicapped persons.157
Oxford House and the Department of Justice argued that the court of appeals
correctly held that the city's rule was not a reasonable restriction of the maxi-
mum number of occupants allowed to occupy a residence under 42 U.S.C. §
3607(b)(1) and was not exempt under the Fair Housing Act. 58 According to
them, the legislative history, language, and purposes of the maximum occupancy
exemption revealed the exemption's application to maximum occupancy limita-
tions on the number of possible occupants for health and safety reasons.'5 9 The
city's ordinance restricted only the number of unrelated persons. 160 It regulated
not the number of persons who could occupy a residence, but the "biological and
legal relationships" of single-family neighborhood residents. 161 Those rules con-
trol the character of zoned areas, according to the respondents, not maximum
occupancy limitations. 16 2 In so regulating, family composition rules create a
"family" atmosphere in a neighborhood.6 Only maximum occupancy restric-
tions are exempted, not family-composition rules, they argued.
1 64
In addition, they argued that the city failed to make "reasonable accommoda-
tion."'165 According to them, under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B),
the city discriminated against the residents of Oxford House by refusing to allow
154. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Elliot iv City ofAthens concluded that a similar definition of
family was exempt under the same code. 960 E2d 975 (11 th Cir. 1992). The decision of the Ninth Circuit in
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. conflicted with the decision of the Eleventh Circuit. 115 S. Ct. 1776
(1995).
155. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 6, City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995)
(No. 94-23).
156. Id.
157. Respondent's Brief at 15, Edmonds (No. 94-23).
158. Id. at 14.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 17-18.
162. Id. at 18.
163. Id. at 14.
164. Id. at 18.
165. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1779 (1995).
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them to live as a group of eight to twelve in the single-family area.16 The city's
regulation did not explicitly come under the maximum occupancy exemption
because it allowed an unlimited number of related residents in a single-family
zone.
167
The reasonable accommodation provision meant that the city had to make a
reasonable effort to provide for the group living needs of handicapped persons,
regardless of how non-handicapped were treated. 8 A restriction is "reasonable"
under the exemption only if it applies uniformly and is reasonably related to the
interest in preventing overcrowded residences for health and safety reasons.
169
Since the city's ordinance did not advance either one of these goals, they argued
that it was not "reasonable" under the exemption.
1 7
1
Further, a city must provide accommodation where the handicapped person
chooses, because the FHAA was enacted to enable handicapped persons "to live
in the residence of their choice in the community. '171 Citing Plainfield,72 the
government contended that the city could not refuse handicapped persons rea-
sonable accommodation in one part of the city on the basis that other suitable
areas were available.1
73
B. The City sArgument
The city argued that Edmonds' single-family zoning definition was exempt
from FHA coverage as a reasonable occupancy restriction.174 The city relied on
decisions of the United States Supreme Court which recognized the sanctity of
the family, especially concerning single-family residences.17  These decisions
established that a city may use its police powers in zoning to provide the family
protection within the community. 71 Such protection has survived Supreme
Court scrutiny and been upheld as reasonable.1 77 According to the city, allowing
group homes such as the one at issue in this case to locate in single-family neigh-
borhoods would have destroyed traditional Euclidian zoning.
1 78
The city argued that the occupancy exemption applied to the city for three rea-
sons. 79 First, the history of single-family zoning had allowed single-family zon-
ing as a reasonable limitation regarding the maximum number of occupants
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1782-83.
168. Id. at 1779.
169. Id. at 1781.
170. Id.
171. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 23, at 22.
172. Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 E Supp. 1329, 1344 (D.N.J. 1991).
173. Reply Brief for the United States at 35, City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995)
(No. 94-23).
174. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1782 (1995). The FHAA exemption for rea-
sonable local occupancy is 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1988).
175. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 7, 9-10, Edmonds (No. 94-23).
176. Id. at9.
177. Id. at 10.
178. Id. at 11.
179. Id. at 7, 11-22.
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allowed to reside in a dwelling.18 Here, the city relied on Euclid.18 Second, the
plain meaning doctrine bolstered the argument for single-family zoning being a
reasonable occupancy limit. 82 The city's definition of family followed exactly
the language approved by the Supreme Court in Belle Terre.'83 The legislation
extended single-family zone protection to the extended family following
Moore.'84 Third, the legislative history of the FHAA indicated that the legisla-
ture's intent was the provision of fair housing opportunities for disabled persons,
not permission to disregard traditional zoning regulation. 8 5 The FHAA prohibit-
ed a city from establishing special requirements applicable only to the disabled
based upon their disability in violation of the precepts set forth in Cleburne.8
and did not overrule single-family zoning by implication alone. 87
Further, the city claimed that reasonable accommodation for group homes for
handicapped persons was made available in non-single-family zones.1
C. The Supreme Court Holding
By a six-three vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Ninth
Circuit. 89 Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg framed the issue as
"whether Edmonds' family composition rule qualifies as a 'restrictio[n] regard-
ing the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling' within
the meaning of the FHA's absolute exemption" under § 3607(b)(1).
1 90
In concluding that the city could not rely on its zoning restriction to regulate
Oxford House, the Court pointed to the distinction between municipal land use
restrictions and maximum occupancy restrictions: "Land use restrictions desig-
nate 'districts in which only compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses
are excluded' . . . . These restrictions typically categorize uses as single-family
residential, multiple-family residential, commercial, or industrial' 91" By contrast,
maximum occupancy restrictions limit the number of occupants in a dwelling in
order to protect health and safety by preventing housing overcrowding.'92
Ginsburg reasoned that the exemption in § 3607 was intended to encompass
only a governmental unit's efforts to protect the public health, safety, and wel-
fare; it did not permit the government to discriminate in order to preserve the
family character of a neighborhood.19 She concluded that
180. Id. at 11.
181. Id. (citing Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
182. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 7, 15-18, Edmonds (no. 94-23).
183. Id. at 8. (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
184. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 8, Edmonds (no. 94-23) (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977)).
185. Id. at 17-22.
186. Id. at 20-21 (referring to City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 28.
189. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1783 (1995).
190. Id. at 1780.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1781.
193. Id. at 1781-83.
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rules that cap the total number of occupants in order to prevent over-crowding
of a dwelling "plainly and unmistakably". . . fall within § 3607(b)(1)'s absolute
exemption from the FHA's governance; rules designed to preserve the family
character of a neighborhood, fastening on the composition of households rather
than on the total number of occupants living quarters can contain, do not.19 4
The Court held that Edmonds' zoning code provision which described who may
compose a family was not a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA
under § 3607(b)(1), the exemption for "reasonable local ... restrictions regarding
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling."19 ' Therefore,
Edmonds could not rely on its zoning ordinance to regulate Oxford House since
the zoning provisions invoked against Oxford House were typical use restrictions
and family composition rules which restrict residences to families. 96
Finally, the Court noted that its decision was limited to the precise question
before it and did not answer the broader question of whether the city's regulation
constituted bias, in violation of the FHA.197 The lower court was left to decide
whether the city's actions against Oxford House were prohibited as discriminato-
ry under the FHA in §§ 3604(f)(1)(A) and (f)(3)(B).'9 8
Justice Thomas dissented,'99 maintaining that the majority failed to "give effect
to the plain language of the statute."20 In keeping with the premise in Gregory v.
Ashcroft,2"' Thomas would not have given the exemption the narrow construction
that the majority did.20 2 Instead, he would have allowed the police powers of the
states wide discretion since zoning has traditionally been reserved to states.20 3
According to Thomas, the ordinance constituted a maximum occupancy restric-
tion because it imposed restrictions on the maximum number of occupants of a
residence.0 4 As such, Thomas would have upheld the restriction as an exemption
under the FHA and reversed the holding of the Ninth Circuit.
205
VII. ANALYSIS
The Edmonds decision offers greater protection under the FHAA for the rights
of disabled persons in group homes. The decision provides further clarification
that, under the FHA, a city may not use zoning restrictions to prohibit establish-
ment of group drug and alcohol rehabilitation homes in areas zoned for single-
family residences. Even though the Supreme Court recognized the right to main-
tain residential neighborhoods and broad zoning plans under Euclid, zoning
power must not exceed constitutional boundaries.
194. Id. at 1782.
195. Id. at 1783. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1782.
197. Id. at 1783.
198. Id.
199. Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined Justice Thomas's dissent. Id.
200. Id.
201. 501 U.S. 452, 456-70 (1991).
202. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1785 (1995).
203. Id. at 1786.
204. Id. at 1784, 1788.
205. Id. at 1785.
[VOL. 17:381
MAXIMUM OCCUPANCY RESTRICTION OF THE FHA
Since Euclid,"8 the Supreme Court and lower courts have accorded broad def-
erence to local regulation of zoning that does not infringe on fundamental rights.
Many cases have enforced zoning ordinances which regulated the type, not the
number, of residents insofar as the ordinances mandate stable, single-group
arrangements.207
Edmonds recognizes the right of communities to preserve residential neighbor-
hoods under an overall zoning scheme. This decision maintains the residential
character of single-family neighborhoods while at the same time providing fair
housing opportunities to recovering addicts. Although the amended FHA and suc-
cessful cases by group recovery homes have curbed municipalities' exclusion of
these homes, these decisions do not substantially restrict legitimate local concerns.
Most importantly, the decision protects the constitutional rights of recovering
addicts and alcoholics to fair housing for rehabilitation. The FHAA expanded
the boundaries for the zoning of group homes, from the traditional deference
given to municipal zoning authorities. For group homes, such as Oxford Houses,
the FHAA has been invaluable in challenging exclusionary regulation of group
homes. The statute prohibits restrictions which municipalities use to exclude
group homes. As a result of Edmonds, courts likely will more closely scrutinize
zoning ordinances such as the one at issue in this decision.
Edmonds upholds the anti-discrimination policies of the FHA regarding the
handicapped. Edmonds makes clear that, under the FHA, a city may not use zon-
ing ordinances to prohibit the establishment of group drug and alcohol recovery
homes in areas zoned for single-family residences. Courts interpret the defini-
tion of "handicapped" to include recovering addicts as a protected class under the
FHAA and are therefore a protected class under the FHAA." 8 Although the
Supreme Court did not extend suspect class status to the handicapped in
Cleburne,"' the FHA provided more protection for their housing needs. The
broad meaning of discriminatory intent under the FHA prohibits discriminatory
zoning regulation. Protection in housing for the handicapped has been chal-
lenged in Oxford House and other cases and upheld.
Under Edmonds, a zoning code definition of the term "family" which includes
an unlimited number of related persons or five or fewer unrelated persons is not
a maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA. Instead, the FHA
applies only to occupancy limits such as numerical limits which prevent over-
crowded residences, such as for health and safety reasons. The legislative history
of the FHA indicates an intention not to exempt restrictions on unrelated resi-
dents. In fact, the preface to the exemption indicates its intention to exempt fam-
ily-status restrictions. Lack of reference to unrelated individuals shows that they
were not intended to be covered by the exemptions. Thus, the decision appropri-
ately separates health regulations from lifestyle choices.
206. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
207. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
208. United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992); Oxford House-Evergreen v.
City of Plainfield, 769 E Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991).
209. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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This decision is significant because many zoning ordinances have an unrelat-
ed-persons definition of family. Some are unlimited in number. However, a
majority of regulations limit the number of unrelated persons who can make up a
"family." Edmonds indicates that such numerical definitions will be scrutinized
for discrimination and will be found discriminatory if they have a disparate
impact on housing opportunities for handicapped persons.
Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that a city cannot offer substitute
areas for housing in multi-family and commercial zones in order to exclude
group homes from single-family residential neighborhoods. The rejection of the
Elliott' decision by the Supreme Court in Edmonds established that zoning laws
should not deprive recovering addicts of fair housing. Ruling that the exemption
applied in Edmonds would have meant that municipal governments could apply
facially neutral zoning to restrict housing opportunities for handicapped persons
under the FHA. This ruling could have eliminated the FHAs protection for simi-
lar group homes throughout the United States.
However, changes are needed in maximum occupancy restriction regulations.
Despite the ostensible purposes of the maximum occupancy restrictions, these
restrictions limit a handicapped person's choice of residences and, therefore, do
not uphold the policies of the FHAA. In group homes, the residents are finan-
cially independent. A minimum number of residents is needed to afford higher
rents in decent areas and for economic viability once established. 11
In the future, city, state, and federal governments could clarify this area of the
law to protect recovering addicts in group homes and prevent exclusionary zon-
ing. Modified local zoning ordinances would supplant state and national legisla-
tion. State governments could also amend their statutes. In addition, Congress
could further amend the FHA to clarify that maximum occupancy restrictions are
limited to health and safety reasons. Without this legislation, group recovery
homes will continue to provoke local zoning ordinances which try to evade dis-
parate impact and reasonable accommodation protection under the FHA to main-
tain traditional zoning patterns.
Changes in the law would also decrease federal court litigation. Over the
years, cases between group homes and cities have largely centered on the conflict
between federal law and local zoning ordinances. The federal courts have been
called on to hear issues of traditional state concern with the federal courts, rather
than community boards, deciding zoning matters.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the FHAA is to remove barriers that limit the ability of persons
to live in the residence of their choice in the community. By declining to find
the maximum occupancy limitation exempt under the FHA, Edmonds proscribes
the unlawful discrimination of facially neutral laws which limit housing opportu-
nities for handicapped persons. Overcoming community barriers to establishing
210. Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 E2d 975 (11 th Cir. 1992).
211. Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 E Supp. 1556, 1571 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
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recovery homes such as this will help reduce drug and alcohol abuse and also
combat HIV and other associated problems. Not only does this decision afford
greater opportunities for recovering drug addicts and alcoholics, but it should
also provide more protection for homes for the elderly, homeless, mentally
retarded, and mentally ill. Thus, following Edmonds, cities in the future will find
it harder to exclude disfavored groups from single-family neighborhoods.

